Can Personnel Decisions Be “Reversed”? The Question Posed by Ford’s EV Executive Departure
Ford Motor Company has announced the departure of an executive responsible for its electric vehicle (EV) strategy. Media headlines report it as an “organizational restructuring accompanying a strategic review.” At first glance, it might seem like a natural flow to change the person in charge when the strategic direction shifts.
However, viewed from the perspective of “reversible management,” a crucial, overlooked question lurks here. It is the question of “how much can a decision be ‘reversed’ later, once full authority over a strategy has been delegated to a specific individual, ‘fixing’ the organization’s expectations onto them?”
This is the significance of interpreting news about a giant corporation like Ford from the viewpoint of a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME) owner. While the scale differs, the structural decision of “appointing talented personnel to lead a promising new venture and granting them significant authority and budget” is common to all companies. What price does an organization pay when this decision becomes “irreversible”?
The Fine Line Between “Investing in Talent” and “Fixing Roles”
For new ventures, especially in areas requiring disruptive innovation like EVs, finding a capable leader and concentrating authority and resources on them seems, at first glance, the optimal solution. Ford likely chose this path to avoid falling behind Tesla in the EV field.
The problem lies in whether that decision was “reversible.” One of the fundamental principles of “reversible management” is to “look at the work, not the person.” However, we often fall into “dependence on a person”—the belief that “if we leave it to that person, it will be fine.” At this point, the decision made by management should have originally been an “experiment to succeed in the ‘work’ of the EV business.” Yet, imperceptibly, the objective shifts to “succeeding with the specific executive as a ‘person’,” and that individual and the strategy become firmly intertwined.
When this bond becomes “fixed,” corrections become extremely difficult when circumstances change. The executive’s personal career and prestige, and the existence of internal factions supporting them, become massive psychological and political resistance to reviewing the strategy itself. Consequently, shifting strategy requires the dramatic “severance” of the person’s departure. This is a typical cost brought about by losing the reversibility of a decision—an “irreversible decision.”
“Initial Stumbles” Are Created by the Fixing of Decisions
Alongside this news, it’s worth noting the observations regarding “initial stumbles” in transformation. The cause of transformation failure often lies in the first step—the “initial phase” where organizational direction and on-the-ground efforts fail to align.
At the root of this “stumble” also lies “fixation.” Management prematurely fixes a vision they are convinced is “the correct answer” (e.g., “complete the shift to EVs by 202X”) and the “chosen leader” to execute it. Then, the frontline is merely expected to follow this fixed vision and leader, losing the leeway to observe and adapt to the situation themselves. Even if market reactions differ from assumptions or technological progress points in another direction, it becomes institutionally and psychologically difficult to deviate from the “set track.”
In Ford’s case, “unexpected” situational changes occurred, such as slowing EV market growth and intensifying competition. If the initial decision hadn’t been “fixed,” there might have been an option to “flexibly adjust the strategy together with the entrusted leader.” However, when the person and strategy are fused, reviewing the strategy inevitably involves a personnel rupture. This is the mechanism by which an “initial stumble” develops into an irrecoverable “fall.”
Three Practical Perspectives for Designing “Reversible Personnel” Decisions
So, how can we make decisions “reversible” when deploying talent into promising new ventures? Here are three perspectives SME owners can implement starting tomorrow.
1. Define “Role” and “Experiment,” Not Just “Title”
When appointing a new venture leader, before granting a fixed title like “Head of EV Division” along with fixed authority, first define the “role.” For example, “the person responsible for leading the verification of market entry feasibility into Market B using Technology A over the next 12 months.”
This definition must clearly state the “evaluation period” and “key success indicators (KPIs) to observe.” Crucially, these indicators should include not just “sales” or “market share,” but also “degree of hypothesis validation” and “unexpected discoveries.” The leader’s mission should be positioned not as “succeeding,” but as “reliably executing the experiment to test this hypothesis.” This prevents the fixation of person and strategy, allowing a natural return to the judgment of “reviewing the role’s scope and personnel based on experimental results” after the period.
2. “Lend” Authority, Don’t “Grant” It Permanently
New ventures require a degree of discretionary authority. However, this should not be “granted” indefinitely and unconditionally. Maintain the mindset that it is “lent out within a specific scope, for a specific period.”
Specifically, when granting authority “on a trial basis”—such as sole budget execution rights or contracting authority up to a certain amount—clearly define its limits and expiration. It’s also effective to include clauses in internal regulations, such as “the validity of this system will be reviewed quarterly and may be changed or revoked as necessary.” This makes it easier for the leader themselves to have the awareness of being a “temporarily entrusted experiment leader” rather than a “fixed authority holder,” enabling flexible responses to situational changes.
3. Always Have a “Second Team” Running in Parallel
The most dangerous scenario is when knowledge and networks related to a specific business or technology become concentrated in one leader. This is the epitome of “personalization,” and when that person leaves, the continuity of the business itself is jeopardized.
To prevent this, it is advisable to establish a small “second team” or “monitoring role” directly under management, separate from the main project team. Their role is not to interfere with the main team’s work but to investigate the same challenge from different angles and collect information in parallel. For example, if the EV team is focused on lithium-ion batteries, the second team watches trends in solid-state or fuel cells. This prevents the organization’s perspective from narrowing and ensures the information foundation needed to quickly “return” to alternative options if the main path hits a dead end is not lost.
Withdrawal is a Transition to the “Next Experiment,” Not a “Severance”
The Ford case appears to be heading towards a conclusion with the executive’s departure—a “severance.” However, “reversible management” does not aim for such dramatic and costly endings.
If reversibility is designed into decisions, a strategy review can be handled smoothly as the “conclusion of an experiment.” “The initial hypothesis of ‘entering Market A’ did not achieve the expected outcome indicators during the verification period. Therefore, we will stop continued investment under the current structure and, based on the insights gained (e.g., the effectiveness of Technology B), form a new, smaller-scale experiment team.” In this way, an explanation focused on “the experiment’s results” rather than “the person’s evaluation” becomes possible.
The leader themselves would not have to leave bearing the full weight of failure but could be transferred to another important experiment (project) within the organization as someone who “completed an important verification mission.” This creates fluidity in personnel.
Vigilance Against “Fixation” Protects Future Options
In management, judgment calls that bet on the future are unavoidable. However, the problem is not the bet itself. The problem is turning the bet into an “irreversible, monolithic decision.”
Ford’s EV executive departure is a warning that even giant corporations can fall into this trap. For SMEs, precisely because resources are limited, a single “irreversible decision” can be fatal.
When deploying people into a new venture, be sure to ask yourself: “Am I about to fix and grant this person a ‘title’? Or am I temporarily entrusting them with a ‘role’ to be verified?” This slight difference in awareness prevents strategic rigidity and builds the foundation for a “reversible organization” that can survive an era of change.
Judgments can always be wrong. That is precisely why what we should design is not an “absolutely correct future,” but a “path that allows us to reliably return if we were wrong.”
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